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Dierent countries { and sometimes dierent regions within the same countries { have adopted
dierent strategies in trying to contain the ongoing COVID-19 epidemic; these mix in variable parts
social connement, early detection and contact tracing. In this paper we discuss the dierent eects
of these ingredients on the epidemic dynamics; the discussion is conducted with the help of two simple
models, i.e. the classical SIR model and the recently introduced variant A-SIR (arXiv:2003.08720)
which takes into account the presence of a large set of asymptomatic infectives.
I. INTRODUCTION
Dierent countries are tackling the ongoing COVID-
19 epidemics with dierent strategies. Awaiting for a
vaccine to be available, the three tools at our disposal
are contact tracing, early detection and social distancing.
These are not mutually exclusive, and in fact they are
used together, but the accent may be more on one or the
other.
Within the framework of classical SIR [1{5] and SIR-
type models, one could say (see below for details) that
these strategies aim at changing one or the other of the
basic parameters in the model.
In this note we want to study { within this class of
models { what are the consequences of acting in these
dierent ways. We are interested not only in the peak of
the epidemics, but also in its duration.
In fact, it is everybody's experience in these days that
social distancing { with its consequence of stopping all
kind of economic activities { has a deep impact on our
life, and in the long run is producing impoverishment
and thus a decline in living conditions of a large part of
population.
In the present study we will not specially focus on
COVID, but discuss the matter in general terms and by
means of general-purpose models.
Our Examples and numerical computations will how-
ever use data and parameters applying to (the early phase
of) the current COVID epidemic in Northern Italy, in or-
der to have realistic examples and gures; we will thus
use data and parameters arising from our analysis of
epidemiological data in the early phase of this epidemic
[6, 7][51]. Unavoidably, we will also here and there refer
to the COVID case.
Some observations deviating from the main line of dis-
cussion { or which we want to pinpoint for easier reference
to them { will be presented in the form of Remarks. The
symbol  marks the end of Remarks.
II. THE SIR MODEL
In the SIR model [1{5], a population of constant size
(this means the analysis is valid over a relatively short
time-span, or we should consider new births and also
deaths not due to the epidemic) is subdivided in three
classes: Susceptibles, Infected (and by this also Infec-
tives), and Removed. The infected are supposed to be
immediately infective (if this is not the case, one consid-
ers so called SEIR model to take into account the delay),
and removed may be recovered, or dead, or isolated from
contact with susceptibles.
Remark 1. We stress that while in usual textbook discus-
sions of the SIR model [2{5] the Removed are either recovered
or dead, in the framework of COVID modeling the infectives
are removed from the infective dynamics { i.e. do not con-
tribute any more to the quadratic term in the equations (1)
below { through isolation. This means in practice hospital-
ization in cases where the symptoms are heavy and a serious
health problem develops, and isolation at home (or in other
places, e.g. in some countries or region specic hotels were
used to this aim) in cases where it is estimated that there is
no relevant risk for the health of the infective. In this sense,
the reader should pay attention to the meaning of R in the
present context. 
The nonlinear equations governing the SIR dynamics
are written as
dS=dt =  S I
dI=dt = S I    I (1)
dR=dt =  I :
These should be considered, in physicists' language, as
mean eld equations; they hold under the (surely not
realistic) assumption that all individuals are equivalent,
and that the numbers are suciently large to disregard
uctuations around mean quantities.
Note also that the last equation amounts to a simple
integration, R(t) = R0+
R t
t0
I(y)dy; thus we will mostly
look at the rst two equations in (1).
2We also stress, however, that epidemiological data can
only collect time series for R(t): so this is the quantity
to be compared to experimental data [2].
Remark 2. In fact, as stressed in Remark 1, in the case of
a potentially dangerous illness (as COVID), once the individ-
uals are identied as infective, they are eectively removed
from the epidemic dynamic through hospitalization or isola-
tion. 
According to our equations (1), S(t) is always decreas-
ing until there are infectives. The second equation in (1)
immediately shows that the number of infectives grows if
S is above the epidemic threshold
 = = : (2)
Thus to stop an epidemic once the numbers are too large
to isolate all the infectives, we have three (non mutually
exclusive) choices within the SIR framework:
(a) Do nothing, i.e. wait until S(t) falls below the epi-
demic threshold;
(b) Raise the epidemic threshold above the present
value of S(t) by decreasing ;
(c) Raise the epidemic threshold above the present
value of S(t) by increasing .
In practice, any State will try to both raise  and lower
, and if this is not sucient await that S falls below the
attained value of .
In order to understand how this is implemented, it is
necessary to understand what  and  represent in con-
crete situations.
The parameter  represents the removal rate of in-
fectives; its inverse  1 is the average time the infec-
tives spend being able to spread the contagion. Raising
 means lowering the time from infection to isolation,
hence from infection to detection of the infected state.
The parameter  represents the infection rate, and as
such it includes many thing. It depends both on the infec-
tion vector characteristics (how easily it spreads around,
and how easily it infects a healthy individual who gets in
contact with it), but is also depends on the occasions of
contacts between individuals. So, roughly speaking, it is
proportional to the number of close enough contacts an
individual has with other ones per unit of time. It follows
that { if properly implemented { social distancing results
in reducing .
Each of these two actions presents some problem.
There is usually some time for the appearance of symp-
toms once an individual is infected, and the rst symp-
toms can be quite weak. So early detection is possible
only by fast tracing and laboratory checking of all the
contacts of those who are known to be infected. This has
a moderate cost (especially if compared to the cost of an
Intensive Care hospital stay) but requires an extensive
organization.
On the other hand, social distancing is cheap in imme-
diate terms, but produces a notable strain of the societal
life, and in practice { as many of the contacts are actu-
ally work related { requires to stop as many production
and economic activities as possible, i.e. has a formidable
cost in the medium and long run. Moreover, it cannot
be pushed too far, as a number of activities and services
(e.g. those carrying food to people, urgent medical care,
etc.) can not be stopped.
Let us come back to (1); using the rst two equations,
we can study I in terms of S, and nd out that
I = I0 + (S0   S)    log(S0=S) : (3)
As we know that the maximum I of I will be reached
when S = , this allows immediately to determine the
epidemic peak. In practice, I0 is negligible and for a new
virus S0 corresponds to the whole population, S0 = N ;
thus
I = N       log(N=) : (4)
Note that only  appears in this expression; that is, rais-
ing  or lowering  produces the same eect as long as
we reach the same .
On the other hand, this simple formula does not tell
us when the epidemic peak is reached, but only that it
is reached when S has the value . But if measures are
taken, these should be eective for the whole duration
of the epidemic, and it is not irrelevant { in particular if
the social and economic life of a nation is stopped { to
be able to evaluate how long this will be for.
A. Timescale of SIR dynamics
Acting on  or on  to get the same  will produce
dierent timescales for the dynamics; see Figure 1, in
which we have used values of the parameters resulting
from our t of early data for the Northern Italy COVID-
19 epidemic [7].
This observation can be made more precise considering
the scaling properties of (1). In fact, consider the scaling
!  ;  !  ; t!  1 t : (5)
It is clear that under this scaling  remains unchanged,
and also the equations are not aected; thus the dynam-
ics is the same but with a dierent time-scale.
The same property can be looked at in a slightly dier-
ent way. First of all, we note that one can write  = =;
moreover,  appears in (1) only in connection with S, and
it is more convenient to introduce the variable
# := S= : (6)
Now, let us consider two SIR systems with the same ini-
tial data but dierent sets of parameters, and let us for
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FIG. 1: Dierent eect of acting on the  or the  parameter.
The SIR equations (1) are numerically integrated and I(t)
plotted in arbitrary units for given initial conditions and ; 
parameters (solid), the maximum I being reached at t = t.
Then they are integrated for the same initial condition but
raising  by a factor # = 3=2 (dashed) with maximum I =
rI reached at time t = t; and lowering  by the same
factor # = 3=2 (dotted) with maximum I = I reached at
time t = t. Time unit is one day,  = (4=3)  10 8,
 = 1=7; these parameters arise from our tting of data from
the early phase of COVID epidemics in Northern Italy [7];
the population of the most aected area in the initial phase is
about 20 million, that of the whole Italy is about 60 million.
The numerical simulation is ran with N = 6  107; it results
r = 0:74,  = 1:63,  = 1:09, I = 3:08  107, t = 26:4;
note that = = 3=2 = #.
ease of notation just consider the rst two equations of
each. Thus we have the two systems
 1 d#=dt =   # I ; dI=dt =  (#  1) I ; (7)e 1 de#=dt =  e e# eI ; deI=dt = e (e#  1) eI : (8)
We can consider the change of variables ( > 0)
e =  e := b ; t!  1 t :=  : (9)
With this, (8) becomes
 e 1 (de#=d) =  b e# eI ; (deI=d) = b (e#  1) eI :
We can thus eliminate the factor  in both equations.
However, if we had chosen  = e=, we get b = ; if
moreover e = , the resulting equation is just
 1 de#=d =   e# eI ; deI=d =  (e#  1) eI : (10)
But we had supposed the initial data for fS; Ig and for
feS; eIg (and hence also for # and e#) to be the same. We
can thus directly compare (10) with (7).
We observe that fe#; eIg have thus exactly the same dy-
namics in terms of the rescaled time  as f#; Ig in terms
of the original time t. In particular, if the maximum of
I is reached at time t, the maximum of eI is reached at
 = t, and hence atet =   =  t : (11)
Analytical results on the timescale change induced by
a rescaling of the  and  parameters have recently been
obtained by M. Cadoni [9]; see also [10].
Remark 3. We have supposed infected individuals to be im-
mediately infective. If this is not the case an \Exposed" class
should be introduced. This is not qualitatively changing the
outcome of our discussion, so we prefer to keep to the simplest
setting. (Moreover, for COVID it is known that individuals
become infective well before developing symptoms, so that
our approximation is quite reasonable.) 
III. A-SIR MODEL
One of the striking aspects of the ongoing COVID-19
epidemic is the presence of a large fraction of asymp-
tomatic infectives [11{22]; note that here we will always
use \asymptomatic" as a shorthand for \asymptomatic
or paucisymptomatic", as also people with very light
symptoms will most likely escape to clinical detection
of COVID { and actually most frequently will not even
think of consulting a physician.[52]
A. The model and its parameters
In order to take this aspect into account, we have re-
cently formulated a variant of the SIR model [7] in which
together with known infectives I(t), and hence known
removed R(t), there are unregistered infectives J(t) and
unregistered removed U(t). Note that in this case re-
moval amounts to healing; so while the removal time  1
for known infected corresponds to the time from infection
to isolation, thus in general slightly over the incubation
time Ti (this is Ti ' 5:1 days for COVID), the removal
time  1 for unrecognized infects will correspond to in-
cubation time plus healing time.
In the model, it is supposed that symptomatic and
asymptomatic infectives are infective in the same way.
This is not fully realistic, as one may expect that some-
body having the rst symptoms will however be more
retired, or at east other people will be more careful in
contacts; but this assumption simplies the analysis,and
is not completely unreasonable considering that for most
of the infection-to-isolation time  1 the symptoms do
not show up.
The equations for the A-SIR model [7] are
dS=dt =   S (I + J)
dI=dt =   S (I + J)    I
dJ=dt =  (1  ) S (I + J)    J (12)
dR=dt =  I
dU=dt =  J :
Note that here too we have a \master" system of three
equations (the rst three) while the last two equations
4amount to direct integrations, R(t) = R0 + 
R t
t0
I(y)dy,
U(t) = U0 + 
R t
t0
J(y)dy:
The parameter  2 [0; 1] represents the probability that
an infected individual is detected as such, i.e. falls in the
class I. In the absence of epidemiological investigations
to trace the contacts of known infectives, this corresponds
to the probability of developing signicant symptoms.
In the rst (arXiv) circulated version [8] of our previous
work [8], some confusion about the identication of the
class J was present, as this was sometimes considered to
be the class of asymptomatic infectives, and sometimes
that of not registered ones[53]. While this is not too
much of a problem considering the \natural" situation,
it becomes so when we think of action on this situation.
Actually, and unfortunately, this confusion has a con-
sequence exactly on one of the points we want to discuss
here, i.e. the eect of a campaign of chasing the infec-
tives, e.g. among patients with light symptoms or within
social contacts of known infectives; let us thus discuss
briey this point.
If J is considered to be the set of asymptomatic virus
carriers, then a rise in the fraction of these who are known
to be infective, and thus isolated, means that the average
time for which asymptomatic infectives are not isolated
is decreasing. In other words, we are lowering  1 and
thus raising . On the other hand, in this description 
is the probability that a new infective is asymptomatic,
and this depends only on the nature of the virus and its
interactions with the immune system of the infected peo-
ple; thus in this interpretation  should be considered as
a constant of nature, and it cannot be changed. (This is
the point of view taken in [7]; however some of the as-
sumptions made in its rst version [8] were very reason-
able only within the concurrent interpretation, described
in a moment.)
On the other hand, if J is the class of unknown infec-
tives, things are slightly dierent. In fact, to be in this
class it is needed (a) that the individual has no or very
light symptoms; but also (b) that he/she is not traced and
analyzed by some epidemiological campaign, e.g. due to
contacts with known infected or because belonging to
some special risk category (e.g. hospital workers). In
this description,  is a constant of nature, depending on
the nature of the virus and on the response of the \aver-
age" immune system of (asymptomatic) infected people,
while eorts to trace asymptomatic infectives will act on
raising the probability .
We want to discuss the eect of early detection of in-
fectives, or tracing their contacts, within the second men-
tioned framework. Note that a campaign of tracing con-
tacts of infectives is useful not only to uncover infectives
with no symptoms, but if accompanied by eective isola-
tion of contacts with known infectives, and thus of those
who are most likely to be infective, it will also reduce
the removal time of \standard" (i.e. symptomatic) infec-
tives, possibly to a time smaller than the incubation time
itself.
Remark 4. In this sense, we will look at an increase in 
as early detection of infectives, and at an increase in both 
and  (thus a reduction in the removal times  1 and  1)
as tracing contacts of infectives. This should be kept in mind
in our nal discussion about the eect of dierent strategies.

Remark 5. As mentioned above, one should also avoid any
confusion between asymptomatic and pre-symptomatic infec-
tion. In our description, pre-symptomatic infectives { i.e. in-
dividuals which are infective and which do not yet display
symptoms, but which will at a later stage display them { are
counted in the class of \standard" infectives, i.e. those who
will eventually display symptoms and hence be intercepted by
the Health system with no need for specic test or contact rac-
ing campaigns, exactly due to the appearance of symptoms.
Actually one expects that except for the early phase of the
epidemics in the countries which were rst hit in a given area
(such as China for Asia, or Italy for Europe), when symp-
toms could be attributed to a dierent illness, most infec-
tions by symptomatic people are actually pre-symptomatic,
as with the appearance of symptoms people are either hos-
pitalized or isolated at home; and even before any contact
with the Health system they will avoid contacts with other {
and other people will surely do their best to avoid contacts
with anybody displaying even light COVID symptoms. In
the case of asymptomatic infectives, instead, unless they are
detected by means of a test or contact tracing campaign { see
the forthcoming discussion { they remain infective until they
recover, so that in this case removal is indeed equivalent to
(spontaneous) recovery. 
B. A glimpse at COVID matters
This approach, indeed, was taken in one of the areas of
early explosion of the contagion in Northern Italy, i.e. in
Vo Euganeo; this had the advantage of being a small com-
munity (about 3,000 residents), and all of them have been
tested twice while embargo was in operation. In fact, this
was the rst systematic study showing that the number
of asymptomatic carriers was very high, quite above the
expectations [23]. Apart from its scientic interest, the
approach proved very eective in practical terms, as new
infectives were quickly traced and in that specic area
the contagion was stopped in a short time.
While testing everybody is not feasible in larger com-
munities, the \follow the contacts" approach could be
used on a larger scale, especially with the appearance of
new very quick kits for ascertaining positivity to COVID.
The model will thus react to a raising of  by raising
the fraction of I within the class of infectives, i.e. in
K = I + J ; but at the same time, as critical patients are
always the same, i.e. represents always the same fraction
of K, we should pay attention to the fact they will now
represent a lower fraction of I. The Chinese experience
shows that critical patients are about 10 % of hospital-
ized patients (i.e. of those with symptoms serious enough
5to require hospitalization); and hospitalized patients rep-
resented about half of known infected, the other being
cured and isolated at home. Similar percentages were
observed in the early phase of the COVID epidemic in
Italy; the fraction of infectives isolated at home has af-
terwards diminished, but it is believed that this was due
to a dierent policy for lab exams, i.e. checking prior-
itarily patients with multiple symptoms suggesting the
presence of COVID rather than following the contacts.
Actually this policy was followed in most of Italy, but
in one region (Veneto) the tracking of contacts and lab
exams for them was pursued, and in there the percent-
ages were much more similar to those known to hold for
China.
C. Numerical simulations protocol. Parameters
and initial data
In our previous work [7] we have considered data for
the early phase of COVID epidemics in Italy, and found
that  1 ' 7 best ts them while the estimate  1 ' 21
was considered as a working hypothesis. This same work
found as value of the contact rate in the initial phase
 ' 1:13  10 8, and we will use this in our numerical
simulations.[54]
It should be stressed that the extraction of the param-
eter  from epidemiological data is based on the number
S0 ' N of susceptibles at the beginning of the epidemic,
thus  and hence  depend on the total population. The
value given above was obtained considering N = 2  107,
i.e. the overall population of the three regions (Lom-
bardia, Veneto and Emilia-Romagna) which were mostly
aected in the initial phase.
Our forthcoming discussion, however, does not want
to provide a forecast on the development of the COVID
epidemic in Northern Italy; we want instead to discuss
{ with realistic parameters and framework { what would
be the dierences if acting with dierent strategies in an
epidemic with the general characteristics of the COVID
one. Thus we will adopt the aforementioned parameters
as \bare" ones (dierent strategies consisting indeed on
acting on one or the other of these) but will apply these
on a case study initial condition; this will be given by
I0 = 10 ; J0 = 90 ; R0 = U0 = 0 : (13)
One important parameter is missing from this list, i.e.
the detection probability . Following Li et al. [24] we
assumed in previous work that  is between 1=10 and 1=7.
Later works (and a general public interview by the Head
of the Government agency handling the epidemic [25])
suggested that the lower bound is nearer to the truth;
moreover a lower  will give us greater opportunity to
improve things by acting on it (we will see this is not the
best strategy, so it makes sense to consider the setting
more favorable to it). We will thus run our simulation
starting from a \bare" value  = 1=10.
As for the total population, we set N = 2  107. With
these choices we get
 = 1:26  107 ; S0

' 1:58 : (14)
We would like to stress once again that we will work
with constant parameters, while in reality the parameters
are changing all the time due to the continuing eorts to
contain the epidemic. So our discussion is valid for what
concerns the eect of dierent actions, but the absolute
values of infected and other classes are by no means a
forecast of what will happen; rather they should be seen
{ in particular, those relating to the \bare" parameters {
as a projection of what could have happened if no action
was undertaken.
Remark 6. A note by an Oxford group [26], much discussed
(also in general press [27]) upon its appearance, hinted that
in Italy and UK this fraction could be as low as  = 1=100.
We have ascertained that with this value of , and assuming
 was not changed by the restrictive measures adopted in the
meanwhile, the A-SIR model ts quite well the epidemiologi-
cal data available to the end of April. However, despite this,
we do not trust this hypothesis { at least for Italy { for vari-
ous reasons, such as (in order of increasing relevance): (i) A
viral infection showing eects only in 1% of aected individu-
als would be rather exceptional; (ii) Albeit in our opinion the
eect of social distancing measures adopted in Italy is some-
times overestimated, we trust that there has been some eect;
(iii) if only 1% of infected people was detected, in some parts
of Italy the infected population would be over 100%. On the
other hand, the main point made by this report [26], i.e. that
only a large scale serological study, checking if people have
COVID antibodies, will be able to tell how diuse the infec-
tion is { and should be performed as soon as possible { is by
all means true and correct. See also [28]. 
D. Balance between registered and unregistered
infectives
A look at eqs.12 shows that I will grow provided
 S

>
I
I + J
=
I
K
:= x ; (15)
where again  = =, and we have introduced the ratio
x(t) of known infectives over total infectives. In other
words, now the epidemic threshold
I =

x


 (16)
depends on the distribution of infectives in the classes I
and J . Note that if x =  (as one would expect to happen
in early stages of the epidemic), then I = .
Needless to say, we have a similar result for J , i.e. J
will grow as far as
(1  )S 

>
J
I + J
=
J
K
:= y = 1  x ; (17)
6thus the epidemic threshold for unregistered infectives is
J =

1  x
1  



: (18)
For x =  (see above) we would have J = (=) < .
It is important to note that x is evolving in time. More
precisely, by the equations for I and J we get
dx
dt
=   S   (S +    ) x + (   )x2
= S (   x) + (   ) (x2   x) : (19)
The behavior observed in Fig.2, which displays x(t)
and related quantities on a numerical solution of eqs.(12),
can be easily understood intuitively. In the rst phase of
the epidemic, there is an exponential growth of both I
and J ; due to the structure of the equations, they grow
with the same rate, so their ratio remains constant; on
the other hand, once the dynamics get near to the epi-
demic peak, the dierence in the permanence time of the
two (that is, the time individuals remain in the infect
class) becomes relevant, and we see (plots (a2) and (b2)
of Fig.2) that not only the peak for J is higher than the
one for I, but it occurs at a slightly later time. Moreover,
descending o the peak is also faster for I, as  1 <  1,
and thus x further decreases, until it reaches a new equi-
librium while both classes I and J go exponentially to
zero.
If we look at (19) we see that for xed S the variable
x would have two equilibria (one stable with 0 < x < 1
and one unstable with x > 1,stability following from  
 > 0), easily determined solving dx=dt = 0. Numerical
simulations show that { apart from an initial transient
{ actually x(t) stays near, but in general does not really
sticks to, the stable xed point determined in this way.
E. The basic reproduction number
A relevant point should be noted here. If we consider
the sum
K(t) := I(t) + J(t) (20)
of all infectives, the A-SIR model can be cast as a SIR
model in terms of S, K, and Q = R+ U as
dS=dt =  S K
dK=dt = S K   BK (21)
dQ=dt = BK
where B is the average removal rate, i.e.
B = x + (1  x)  :
As x varies in time, this average removal rate is also
changing. On the other hand, the basic reproduction
number (BRN) 0 (this is usually denoted as R0, but
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FIG. 2: Dynamics of x(t) in the A-SIR model. We plot x(t)
in upper plots (a1) and (b1); and I(t) (dashed curve) and
J(t) (solid curve) in lower plots (a2) and (b2). These are
considered along the solutions of the A-SIR model for  =
1:13  10 8,  = 1=7,  = 1=14, and  = 1=10; in the left
column, i.e. in plots (a1) and (a2), with S0 = 2  107 and
I0 + J0 = 10; in the right column, i.e. in plots (b1) and (b2),
for S0 = 6  107 and I0+ J0 = 30. The scale of plots (a2) and
(b2) is chosen so that the maximum of J(t) is at level one.
we prefer to change this notation in order to avoid any
confusion with initial data for the known removed R(t))
for this model will be
0 =

B
S >


S : (22)
In other words, not taking the asymptomatic infectives
into account leads to an underestimation of the BRN. If
the standard SIR model predicts a BRN of 0, the A-SIR
model yields a BRN b0 given by
b0 = 
B
0 =

x + (1  x) 0 > 0 : (23)
This means that the epidemic will develop faster, and
possibly much faster, than what one would expect on the
basis of an estimate of 0 based only on registered cases,
which in the initial phase are a subset of symptomatic
cases as the symptoms may easily be leading to a wrong
diagnosis (in the case of COVID they lead to a diagnosis
of standard u).
With our COVID-related values  = 1=7,  = 1=21,
and assuming that in the early phase x =  = 1=10, we
get
b0 = 5
2
0 ; (24)
there is thus a good reason for being surprised by the
fast development of the epidemic: the actual BRN is sub-
stantially higher than the one estimated by symptomatic
infections [29].
7IV. HIDDEN INFECTIVES AND EPIDEMIC
DYNAMICS
More generally, one would wonder what is the eect
of the \hidden" infectives J(t) on the dynamics of the
known infectives I(t) { which, we recall, include the rele-
vant class of seriously aected infectives { and it appears
that there are at least two, contrasting, eects:
1. On the one hand, the hidden infectives speed up
the contagion spread and hence the rise of I(t);
2. On the other hand, they contribute to group im-
munity, so the larger this class the faster (and the
lower the I level at which) the group immunity will
be reached.
The discussion above shows that the balance of these
two factors leads to a much lower epidemic peak, and a
shorter epidemic time, than those expected on the basis
of the standard SIR model (albeit in the case of COVID
with no intervention these are still awful numbers).
On the other hand, we would like to understand if un-
covering a larger number of cases (thus having prompt
isolation of a larger fraction of the infectives) by early
detection, i.e. raising , would alter the time-span of
the epidemic. It appears that this eect can be only
marginal, as it appears only past the epidemic peak.
We stress that this statement refers to \after incuba-
tion" analysis; if we were able to isolate cases before they
test positive { i.e. to substantially reduce  1 { the eect
could be dierent. We will discuss this point, related to
contact tracing, later on.
A. COVID. Observable and \clean" observable
data
An ongoing epidemic is not a laboratory experiment,
and apart from not having controlled external conditions,
i.e. constant parameters, the very collection of data is of
course not the top priority of doctors ghting to save
human lives.
There has been considerable debate on what would be
the most reliable indicator to overcome at least the sec-
ond of these problems. One suggestion is to focus on
the number of deaths; but this is itself not reliable, as
in many cases COVID is lethal on individuals which al-
ready had some medical problem, and registering these
deaths as due to COVID or to some other cause depends
on the protocol adopted, and in some case also on polit-
ical choices, e.g in order to reassure citizens (or on the
other extreme, to stress great care must be taken to avoid
contagion).
Another proposed indicator, possibly the most reliable
in order to monitor the development of the epidemic, is
that of patients in Intensive Care Units. This appears to
be suciently stable over dierent countries, and e.g. the
Italian data tend to reproduce in this respect - at least in
Regions where the sanitary system is not overstretched {
the Chinese ones.
In this case, IC patients are about 20 % of the total
number of hospitalized cases; in China and for a long
time also in Italy (when protocols for choosing would-
be cases to be subject to laboratory analysis have been
stable), hospitalized cases have been about half of the
known infection cases, the other having shown only minor
symptoms and been cured (and isolated) in their home.
The other, more widely used, indicator is simply the
total number of known cases of infection. In view of the
presence of a large class of asymptomatic infectives, this
itself is strongly depending on the protocols for chasing
infectives. On the other hand, this is the most available
indicator: e.g., the W.H.O. situation reports [30] provide
these data.
Each of these indicators, thus, has advantages and dis-
advantages. We will just use the WHO data on known
infected.
In particular, in the case of COVID we expect that
with 0 the \bare" constant describing the probability
that an infection is detected, out of the class I(t) we will
have a 50% of infected with little or no symptoms (IL),
a 40% of standard care hospitalized infected (IH), and a
10% of IC hospitalized infected (IIC). Needless to say,
this class is the most critical one, also in terms of strain
on the health system.
More generally, we say that with 0 the \bare" constant
describing the probability that the infection under study
is detected, there is a fraction 0 (of the detected infec-
tions) belonging to the IIC class; that is, IIC(t) = 0I(t).
Remark 7. We stress this depends on the protocol used to
trigger laboratory tests; in our general theoretical discussion,
this is any such protocol and we want to discuss the conse-
quences of changing this in the sense of more extensive tests.

V. MODIFYING THE PARAMETERS
We are now ready to discuss how modication of one or
the other of the dierent parameters (; ; ) on which we
can act by various means will aect the A-SIR dynamics.
As it should be expected, this will give results similar to
those holding for the SIR model, but now we have one
more parameter to be considered and thus a more rich
set of possible actions.
A. Raising the detected fraction
A more extensive test campaign will raise , say from
0 to 1; but of course this will not change the number
of the most serious cases, as these are anyway getting
to hospital and detected as being due to the infection in
question. Thus the new fraction 1 of detected infections
which need special care will be such that 11 = 00,
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FIG. 3: The eect of a change in  on the IIC class. We have
used  = 1=7,  = 1=21, and  = 1:1310 8 as in Fig.2, with
a total population of N = 2  107, and ran simulations with
 = 1=10 (solid curve) and with  = 1=4 (dashed curve). The
substantial increase in  produces a reduction in the epidemic
peak and a general slowing down of the dynamics, but both
these eects are rather small.
i.e. we have
1 =
0
1
0 : (25)
In order to describe the result of raising , we should thus
compare plots of
IIC(t) =  I(t) : (26)
This is what we do, indeed, in Fig.3.
B. Running ahead of the epidemic wave
Raising  corresponds to having more infective de-
tected, and has some advantages from the point of view
of the epidemic dynamics. In practical terms, this means
extending tests to a larger class of subjects, and be able to
isolate a larger fraction of asymptomatic infectives with
the same speed and eectiveness as symptomatic ones.
A dierent strategy for rapid action is also possible,
and it consists of rapid isolations of subjects who had
contacts with people known to have been infected, or
who have themselves been in contact with known infec-
tives (and so on). In other words, the strategy would be
to isolate would-be infection carriers before any symp-
tom could show up. This means that  1 could be even
smaller than the usual infection-to-isolation time (about
seven days for COVID) for symptomatic infectives, and
even shorter than the incubation time (about ve days
for COVID).
Remark 8. It should be stressed that as each of these \pos-
sible infected" might have a small probability of being actu-
ally infected (depending on the kind of contacts chain leading
to him/her from known infectives), here \isolation" does not
necessarily mean top grade isolation, but might amount to
a very conservative lifestyle, also { and actually, especially {
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FIG. 4: The eect of a change in  on the IIC class. We have
used  = 1=10,  = 1=21, and  = 1:13  10 8 as in Fig.2,
with a total population of N = 2  107, and ran simulations
with  = 1=7 (solid curve) and with  = 1=3 (dashed curve).
The substantial increase in  produces a marked reduction
in the epidemic peak and a very slightly faster pace in the
dynamics.
within home, where a large part of registered Chinese conta-
gions took place. (The same large role of in-home contagion
was observed in Italy in the course of lockdown.) 
We have thus ran a simulation in which  is not
changed, but  is raised from 0 = 1=7 to  = 1=3;
the result of this is shown in Fig.4. In this case we have
a marked diminution of the epidemic peak, and a very
slight acceleration of the dynamics.
C. Social distancing
We have so far not discussed the most basic tool in
epidemic containment, i.e. social distancing. This means
acting on the parameter  by reducing it.
Remark 9. Direct measurement on the epidemiological data
for Northern Italy show that this parameter can be reduced to
about 20% of its initial value with relatively mild measures. In
fact, albeit the media speak of a generalized lockdown in Italy,
the measures have closed schools and a number of commercial
activities, but for the rest were actually more pointing at lim-
iting leisure walk and sports and somewhat avoiding contacts
in shops or in work environment than to a real lockdown as
it was adopted in Wuhan. 
This is a basic action to be undertaken, and in fact
it is being taken by all Nations. It is also the simplest
one to be organized (albeit with high economic and so-
cial costs in the long run) and an action which can be
taken together with other ones. No doubt this should be
immediately taken when an epidemic is starting, and ac-
companied by other measures { such as those discussed
above. But here we want to continue our study of what it
means by itself in terms of modication of the epidemic
dynamics.
It is not clear what can be achieved in terms of reduc-
tion of social contacts. In fact, once the epidemic starts
9most of the dangerous contacts are the unavoidable ones,
such as those arising from essential services and produc-
tion activity (e.g. production and distribution of food
or pharmaceutical goods), contacts at home, and above
all contacts in Hospitals. Thus, after a rst big leap
downward corresponding to closing of schools and Uni-
versities on the one side, and a number of unessential
commercial activities on the other, and restrictions on
travels, it is dicult to further reduce social contacts,
not to say that this would have huge economic and social
costs, and also a large impact on the general health in
terms of sedentariness-related illness (and possibly men-
tal health).
Remark 10. A number of countries tried to further reduce
social contacts by forbidding citizens to get out of their home;
this makes good sense in densely populated areas, but is use-
less in many other areas. The fortunate slogan \stay home"
risks to hide to the general public that the problem is not to
seclude oneself in self-punishment, but to avoid contacts. 
D. Social distancing and epidemic timescale
We point out that there is a further obstacle to reduc-
ing social contacts: as seen in the context of the simple
SIR model, reducing  will lower the epidemic peak, but
it will also slow down the whole dynamic. While this al-
lows to gain precious time to prepare Hospitals to stand
the big wave, there is some temporal limit to an extended
lockdown, and thus this tool cannot be used to too large
an extent.
We have thus ran a simulation in which  and  are
not changed, while  is reduced by a factor 0:75 (smaller
factors, i.e. smaller, produce an untenable length of the
critical phase); the result of this is shown in Fig.5. In this
case we have a relevant diminution of the epidemic peak,
and also a marked slowing down in the dynamics.
An important remark is needed here. It may seem,
looking at this plot, that social distancing is less eective
than other way of coping with the epidemic. But these
simulation concern a SIR-type model; this means in par-
ticular that there is no spatial structure in our model
[2]. The travel ban is the most eective way of avoiding
the spreading of contagion from one region to the oth-
ers; while the \local" measures of social distancing can
(and should) be triggered to nd a balance with other
needs, travel ban is the simplest and most eective way
of protecting the communities which have not yet been
touched by the epidemic.
E. Comparing dierent strategies
We can thus compare the dierent strategies we have
been considering. This is done in Fig.6 where we plot
together IIC(t) for all our dierent simulations; and in
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FIG. 5: The eect of a change in  on the IIC class. We have
used  = 1=7,  = 1=10,  = 1=21, with a total population
of N = 2  107, and ran simulations with  = 1:13  10 8
(solid curve) and with  = 8:47  10 9 (dashed curve). The
reduction in  produces a marked reduction in the epidemic
peak and also a marked slowing down in the dynamics.
Table I where we compare the height of the epidemic peak
{ again for IIC(t) { and the time at which it is reached.
In Fig.6 we have also drawn a line representing the hy-
pothetical maximal capacity of IC units. This stresses
that not only the dierent actions lower the epidemic
peak, but they also { and to an even larger extent {
reduce the number of patients which can not be conve-
niently treated.
Remark 11. In looking at this plot, one should remem-
ber that the model does not really discuss permanence in IC
units, and that IIC are the infected which when detected will
require IC treatment; this may go on for a long time { which
is the reason why IC units are saturated in treating COVID
patients. So the plots are purely indicative, and a more de-
tailed analysis (also with real parameters) would be needed
to estimate the IC needs in the dierent scenarios. 
It should be stressed that the strategies of contacts
tracing and early detection are usually played together;
but as confusion could arise on this point, let us briey
discuss it. We have tried to stress that these two ac-
tions are not equivalent: one could conduct random test-
ing, so uncovering a number of asymptomatic infectives,
and just promptly isolate them without tracing their con-
tacts;or on the other extreme one could just isolate ev-
erybody who had a (direct or indirect) contact with a
known infective, without bothering to ascertain if they
are themselves infective or not. This strategy would be
as eective in containing the contagion (and less costly
in terms of laboratory tests) than that of tracking con-
tacts, test them (after a suitable time for the infection
to develop and test give positive if this happens), and
isolate only those who really turn infective. The dier-
ence is that if we isolate everybody this would involve a
huge number of people (e.g. all those who have been in
the same supermarket the same day as an infective; and
their families and contacts etc etc); so in this context
early detection actually should be intended as early de-
tection of non-infectives, so that cautionary quarantine
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  max time
1:13  10 8 1/7 1/10 44768 75
1:13  10 8 1/7 1/4 41482 79
1:13  10 8 1/3 1/10 20943 74
8:47  10 9 1/7 1/10 30956 107
TABLE I: Epidemic peak (for IIC) and time for reaching it (in
days) as observed in our numerical simulations. All simulation
were ran with N = 2  107 and  = 1=21.
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FIG. 6: The eect of dierent strategies. We plot IIC(t)
for N = 2  107 in the "bare" case, i.e. for  = 1:13  10 8,
 = 1=7,  = 1=10,  = 1=21, and in cases where (only) one of
the parameters is changed. In particular we have the bare case
(solid line), the case where  is changed into  = 1=4 (dotted),
the case where  is changed to  = 1=3 (dashed), and that
where  is changed to  = 8:47  10 9 (solid, blue). We also
plot a horizontal line representing a hypothetical maximal
capacity of IC units.
can be kept reasonably short in all the cases where it is
not really needed.
Finally we recall that it is a triviality, and it was al-
ready mentioned in the Introduction, that in real situa-
tions one has not to choose between acting on one or the
other of the parameters, and all kind of actions should
be pursued simultaneously.
F. A dierent indicator
The numerical computations of the previous subsec-
tions suggest that increasing  { that is, detection of a
larger fraction of asymptomatic { is not a very ecient
strategy to counter the diusion of an infection with a
large number of asymptomatic infectives, while a prompt
isolation of infectives is a more eective action.
It should be recalled, however, that in our computa-
tions { and in particular on Figure 6, where their out-
comes are compared { we are focusing on the number of
patients needing IC support, i.e. the most critical pa-
rameter from the point of view of the Health system. In
order to substantiate our conclusions, it is worth consid-
ering also dierent ways to evaluate the eect of dierent
strategies.
We have thus considered also a dierent indicator, i.e.
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FIG. 7: Plot of the total number of infectives K(t) = I(t) +
J(t) for parameters as in (27), (28) and with dierent choices
of the modulation factors i. The initial conditions are chosen
according to (29). In the reference run (black curve, solid) all
the i are equal to 1; in the other runs the modied factors
are as follows: Change of  (blue), r = 2:5; change of 
alone (green), r = 7=3; change of  alone (yellow), r = 7=3;
change of both  and  (red), r = r = 7=3; change of 
(black, dashed), r = 3=5.
the total number of infectives
K(t) := I(t) + J(t) :
We have run several simulations, with total population
N = 2  107 and with parameters
 = 0 ;  = 0 ;  = 0 ;  = 0 : (27)
Here i are modulation factors describing the changes in
the basic parameters, and
0 = 1:13  10 8 ; 0 = 1=7 ; 0 = 1=21 ; 0 = 1=10
(28)
are reference values (already used in the previous subsec-
tions). The initial conditions where chosen so that
K0 = 100 ; I0 = K0 ; J0 = (1  )K0 : (29)
The outcome of these simulations is displayed in Figure
7; see its caption for the parameter (that is, the modula-
tion factor) values in dierent runs.
We see from Figure 7 that action on  slows down
substantially the epidemic dynamics[55] and reduce the
epidemic peak, while action on  or on  alone produce
only a moderate eect. On the other hand, actions af-
fecting the value of  (alone or together with the value
of ) reduce substantially the epidemic peak and slightly
slow down the dynamics.
Remark 12. It may be noted that the shapes of the IIC(t)
(see Figure 6) and of the K(t) (see Figure 7) are dierent;
in particular, the decay of IIC(t) after attaining its peak is
faster than the decay of K(t). This corresponds to what is
observed in the epidemiological data for Italy. 
VI. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
We have considered epidemic dynamics as described by
\mean eld" models of the SIR type; more specically, we
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have rst considered the classical Kermack-McKendrick
SIR model [1{5] and then a recently introduced modied
version of it [7] taking into account the presence of a
large set of asymptomatic { and thus most frequently not
detected { infectives. These models depend on several
parameters, and dierent types of measures can to some
extent change these parameters and thus the epidemic
dynamics. In particular, this action can eect two basic
characteristics of it, i.e. the height of the epidemic peak
and the time-span of the epidemic.
While it is clear that in facing a real lethal epidemics
(such as the ongoing COVID epidemic) all actions which
can contrast it should be developed at the same time, in
this paper we have considered the result { within these
models { of dierent tools at our disposal, i.e. (gen-
eralized) social distancing, early detection (of asymp-
tomatic infectives) and contacts tracing (of symptomatic
and asymptomatic infectives).
It turns out that { both in the classical SIR model
and in the modied A-SIR one { social distancing is ef-
fective in reducing the epidemic peak, and moreover it
slows down the epidemic dynamics. On the other hand,
early detection of asymptomatic infectives seems to have
only a moderate eect in the reduction of the epidemic
peak for what concerns critical cases, and also a very lit-
tle eect on the temporal development of the epidemic.
In contrast, contact tracing has a strong impact on the
epidemic peak { also in terms of critical cases { and does
not substantially alter the temporal development of the
epidemic, at least for what concerns the curve describing
the most serious cases.[56]
Remark 13. The conclusion that early detection of asymp-
tomatic has only a moderate eect may appear to be para-
doxical, and requires some further discussion. First of all we
should remind that we are here actually talking about an in-
crease of the parameter  (see Remark 4), while in a real
situation early detection of asymptomatic will most likely go
together with early detection of symptomatic, and hence a re-
duction in  as well. The increase of  per se means that some
fraction of asymptomatic will be recognized as infective and
be isolated on the same timescale  1 as the symptomatic
infectives, while the other asymptomatic will escape recogni-
tion and still be infective on a timescale  1. On the other
hand, a realistic contact tracing campaign will lead to prompt
isolation of symptomatic and asymptomatic alike, and thus
correspond to a reduction in  1 and in  1, and we have
seen that this action is indeed the most eective one in terms
of contrasting the spread of the epidemic. In other words,
our result suggests that the key to ght COVID is not so
much in detection, but in prompt isolation of infectives, and
most notably of asymptomatic ones. This can be achieved
only by contact tracing { as already suggested by experienced
epidemiologists.[57] 
Slowing down the epidemic dynamic can be a posi-
tive or negative feature depending on the concrete situ-
ation and on the desired eects. It is surely positive in
what concerns getting ready to face the epidemic peak,
in particular in the presence of a faltering Health Sys-
tem. On the other hand, it may be negative in that
maintaining a generalized lockdown for a long time can
have extremely serious economic and social consequences.
Balancing these two aspects is not a matter for the math-
ematician or the scientist, but for the decision maker; so
we will not comment any further about this.
It should also be recalled that our analysis was con-
ducted in terms of very simple SIR-type models, with all
their limitations. In particular, we have considered no
age or geographical or social structure, and only consid-
ered a population of \equivalent" individuals. In partic-
ular, as we have noted above, in the early stage of an
epidemic, which presumably develops in very populated
areas, a generalized travel ban can simply stop the con-
tagion to propagate to other (possibly less well equipped
in medical terms) areas; moreover, social distancing mea-
sures can be implemented very simply { basically, by a
Government order (albeit if we look at the goal of these
measures, i.e. reducing the occasion of exchanging the
virus, a substantial role would be played by individual
protection devices, such as facial masks; in many Euro-
pean countries, these were simply not available to the
general public, and in some cases neither to medical op-
erators, thus substantially reducing the impact of these
measures) { and are thus the rst action to be taken.
In fact, in relation with the ongoing COVID epidemics,
one of the reproaches made to many Governments is usu-
ally to have been too slow or too soft in stopping crowd
gatherings, surely not the contrary.
On the other hand, we hope that this study makes clear
what are the consequences of dierent options. In par-
ticular, our study shows that contacts tracing, followed
by prompt isolation of would-be infected people { is the
only way to reduce the impact of the epidemic without
having to live with it for an exceedingly long time. The
Veneto experience [23] shows that this strategy can be
eectively implemented without hurting privacy or per-
sonal freedom.
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APPENDIX A: AN AFTERSIGHT ON THE A-SIR
MODEL
Our discussion was based on SIR-type models, and in
particular on the A-SIR model. This raises several kind
of questions, which we address in this Appendix.
1. The choice of dealing with SIR-type (i.e. compart-
ment) models in dealing with the COVID-19 epi-
demic could be questioned.
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2. Within this class, the A-SIR model is specially sim-
ple; it makes sense to rely on this model only if it is
able to give a reasonable agreement with observed
data.
3. The A-SIR model is the simplest one taking into
account the presence of asymptomatic infectives.
Other { more detailed { models taking this fact
into account have also been developed.
We are now going to briey discuss these matters; we
point out that this Appendix was inserted in the revised
version of this paper, so it can make use of knowledge
not available at the time of writing the rst submitted
version, nd mentions papers appeared after the rst sub-
mittal.
1. Use of SIR-type models
Compartment models, i.e. SIR-type ones in this con-
text, are based on several implicit and explicit assump-
tions, which are not realistic in many cases and surely
when attempting to describe the COVID epidemic, in
particular in a full country.
That is, among other aspects, SIR-type models are (in
Physics' language) mean eld (averaged) models and as
such describe the dynamics and the underlying system as
if:
 All individuals are equivalent in medical sense, i.e.
they all have equivalent pre-existent health status
and equivalent immune system and react in the
same way to contact with the pathogen;
 In particular, as we know that COVID is statisti-
cally more dangerous for older people, we are com-
pletely disregarding the age structure of the pop-
ulation, as well as the existence of other high risk
classes related to pre-existent pathologies: all these
contribute to an average over the whole population;
 All individuals are equivalent in social sense, i.e.
they all have an equivalent social activity and hence
the same number and intensity of contacts with
other members of the group, thus the same expo-
sure to (possible) infectives;
 In particular, this means we are completely disre-
garding any geographical structure in the popula-
tion, and consider in the same way people living in
large cities or in remote villages, just considering
them in the same global average;
 Similarly, we do not consider that work can cause
some people to be specially exposed through con-
tact with a large number of people (e.g. shop
cashiers) or even with a large number of infected
people (e.g. medical doctors or nurses).
Thus one cannot hope to retain, through such models,
eects like the faster spreading of the infection in more
densely populated areas or the specially serious conse-
quences of the COVID infection among older people.
We stress that these could be obtained by including
geographical, age or social structures into the model, i.e.
increasing the number of considered classes; in principles
this should provide a ner and more realistic description
of the epidemic dynamic, and in fact it is done in cases
for which there is a large set of data, e.g. for inuenza.
Such structured models would of course loose the main
attractive of the SIR model, i.e. its simplicity { which
also allows to understand in qualitative terms the mech-
anisms at work.
In particular, a relevant intermediate class of models
is that of SIR-type models on networks: these take into
account geographical and social structures and make use
of known information about contacts between dierent
groups of individuals and about dierent health charac-
teristics of dierent groups.
The problem with these networked or however more
structured models is that the network should be inferred
from data. In this respect, it could be objected that the
inuenza monitoring over many years could give us the
relevant data for reconstruction of such network; but it is
everybody's experience, by now, that the social behavior
of people are completely dierent if dealing with a well
known and not so serious (except for certain categories)
illness like inuenza or with an unknown and potentially
lethal one like COVID; this not to say that the restric-
tive measures put into eect by many Governments have
completely changed the interaction patterns among peo-
ple, so that previously accumulated data cannot be used
in the present situation.
When thinking of COVID; it should be kept in mind
that even if the countries which were rst hit by the epi-
demic, we only have data over some months; e.g. for Italy
we have about 100 days of data. If we were trying to give
the model a geographical structure at the level of Depart-
ments (which are themselves administrative units mostly
with a very varied internal geographical structure), as
there are 107 Departments in Italy this would require in
the simplest form to evaluate a 107107 interaction ma-
trix, and I cannot see any way to reliably build this out
of such a scarce set of data.
Moreover, the epidemiological data are to some extent
not reliable, especially around the epidemic peak, in that
they are collected in an emergency situation, when other
priorities are present in Hospitals (e.g. in Italy the data
show a weekly modulation, which appears to be due sim-
ply to the procedure of data collection); so an even larger
amount of data would be needed to lter out statistical
noise and random uctuations.
In this sense, the weak point of SIR-type models, i.e.
their being based on an average over the whole popu-
lation, turns out to be an advantage: they contain few
parameters (two for the SIR, four for the A-SIR) and
are thus statistically more robust in that uctuations are
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averaged eciently with less data than for more rened
models with a large number of parameters.
Remark A1. Similar considerations hold when one com-
pares SIR-type models to a purely statistical description or
to an \emerging behavior" approach. These approaches are
extremely powerful, but are eective when one has a large
database to build on and to which compare the outcome of
the \experiment" (in this case the epidemic) under consider-
ation. When we deal with a completely new pathogen,like for
COVID, we simply don't have a database, and we can only
rely on the very general features of infective dynamics { which
are well coded by SIR and SIR-like models. 
In other words, we are not claiming the SIR approach
to be superior to others, but only that it is appropriate
when we have few data { as for COVID.
2. Use of the A-SIR model
Within the SIR-type class, the A-SIR model is spe-
cially simple; from the theoretical point of view its appeal
lies in that it is the simplest possible model taking into
account the presence of a large class of asymptomatic
infectives; thus it focuses on the eect of this fact with-
out the complications of a more detailed model. But, of
course, it makes sense to rely on this model only if it is
able to give a good, or at least a reasonable, agreement
with observed data.
Of course each infective agent has its own characteris-
tics, and using only the general SIR model would com-
pletely overlook them, apart from the dierent values of
the  and  parameters.
Thus we have to do something more than just evaluat-
ing the SIR parameters. In our study we have identied
the presence of a large class of asymptomatic infectives as
one of the key problems in facing the COVID epidemic,
and we have considered a simple model which allows to
focus precisely on this aspect.
One should be aware that the A-SIR model is focusing
on this and not considering other features of COVID, and
indeed other more detailed SIR-type models for COVID
have been formulated and studied (see also below). Here
we are taking an approach which is classical in Mathe-
matical Physics and Mathematical Modeling, i.e. try to
build and study the simplest model describing the phe-
nomenon of interest. This will give results which are
quantitatively worse than a more detailed models, but
which are qualitatively good in that the model is simple
enough to see more clearly what are the mechanisms at
work and to understand the qualitative features if the dy-
namics and the qualitative outcome of any intervention
able to modify the parameters of the model.
Having said that, it remains true that { as mentioned
above { it makes sense to rely on this model only if it is
able to give a reasonable agreement with observed data.
This is not the argument of this paper, and it was dis-
cussed in a previous paper [7]; the success of this model
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FIG. 8: Epidemiological data against solutions of the A-SIR
equations (12) for Italy. Time is measured in days, with day
0 being February 20, 2020. See text for parameter values and
initial conditions.
was the justication for this paper,i.e. for discussing the
eect of dierent COVID-contrasting strategies in terms
of it.
However, the rst version of this paper was submit-
ted at mid-May, hence with two and half months of data
available, while at the time of preparing this revised ver-
sion we have four months of data; that represents a sub-
stantial increase in the available data, and it makes sense
to wonder if the model is still describing the COVID epi-
demic in Italy.
This is indeed the case, as shown in Figure 8; they rep-
resent epidemiological data as communicated by the Ital-
ian Health Ministry and by WHO (and widely available
online through the standard COVID databases) against
a numerical integration of the A-SIR equations (12). We
refer to [7] for a discussion of the parameters and their
determination. Note that the contact rate  is assumed
to vary in response to the restrictive measures (and to
the availability of individual protection devices); as these
measures were taken in dierent steps, we also have dif-
ferent values of  in dierent time intervals.
More precisely, the equations were integrated for a to-
tal population of N = 6  107 for the period February 20
through June 26 with initial data at day 14 (March 5)
given by I0 = 6766, J0 = 60892, R0 = 3862, U0 = 34761,
with  = r(t)0 where
r(t) =
8><>:
1 for t  25
0:5 for 25 < t  35
0:2 for 35 < t  63
0:08 for 63 < t
and the parameters are given by
0 ' 3:77  10 9 ;  = 1=7 ;  = 1=21 ;  = 1=10 :
We stress that the parameter values are the same as in
[7], even for the most recent time, not considered in that
paper: the model continues to reasonably well describe
the development of the epidemic in Italy.
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3. Other SIR-type models
We focused on a specic SIR-type model, but several
models of this type have been considered in the context
of COVID modeling. Here we give a very short overview
of these, with no attempt to completeness { which cannot
even be imagined in such a rapidly evolving eld.
First of all, we note that other researchers have con-
sidered, motivated by the ongoing COVID epidemic, the
temporal aspects of the standard SIR dynamics. We
mention in particular Cadoni [9] (a related, but quite
involved, approach had been considered by Harko, Lobo
and Mak [31]) and Barlow and Weinstein [10], who ob-
tained an exact solution for the SIR equations in terms
of a divergent but asymptotic series [32]; see also [33, 34]
for a dierent approach to exact solution of SIR and SIR-
type models.
We also note that nonlinear modications of the bilin-
ear infection term of the standard SIR model have been
proposed { explicitly or implicitly { in the attempt to re-
late the standard SIR model to COVID dynamics [35, 36].
We nd [36] of special interest, as this work introduces a
model for the epidemic dynamics coupled to the immune
system, and is thus able to take into account aspects re-
lated to the viral charge of infectives.
Extension of the SIR model in the direction of allowing
time-dependence of the parameters { also to account for
shifting public attitude { has also been considered [37].
As mentioned above, see Remark 3, considering the
delay between infection and beginning of infectiveness
would lead to consider SEIR-type models. The prob-
lem of temporal aspects of the dynamics for this class
of models has been considered by Becaer [38]. The role
of asymptomatic transmission in this class of models has
also been considered [39, 40]. The approach to SIR by
Barlow and Weinstein [10] leading to exact solution has
been extended to SEIR model [41].
A generalization of the A-SIR model, allowing for dif-
ferent infectiveness of symptomatic and asymptomatic
infectives, has been considered by Neves and Guerrero
[42].
More elaborated compartment models with a larger
number of compartments have been considered by a num-
ber of authors. We would like to mention in particular
two papers which we consider specially signicant, i.e.
the work by the Pavia group, in which mathematicians,
statisticians and medical doctors collaborated [43], and
the work by Fokas, Cuevas-Maraver and Kevrekidis [44],
in which such a model { involving ve compartments like
the present paper, but chosen in a dierent way { is used
to discuss (as in the present paper) exit strategies from
the COVID lockdown.
As mentioned in the main text, one could { and should
{ consider epidemic dynamics on networks [45]. At-
tempts to analyze the COVID epidemic in this way have
of course been pursued, both on a small scale, with a
network structure which can be determined by direct so-
ciological study [46], and on a nationwide scale [47] where
the network structure has to be determined.
This latter study [47] also attempted to evaluate the
eect of the containment measures; such a matter is of
course very relevant and has been considered by many
authors in many countries; even a cursory mention of
these is impossible, and we will just mention one study
applying to Italy [48]. We also stress that many of the
papers mentioned above, see in particular [43, 44] aim
at using the models they study to evaluate the eect of
interventions and containment measures.
Finally we would like to end on a positive note, and
mention that while on the one hand it was found that the
presence of asymptomatic makes that the basic reproduc-
tion number of COVID is higher than initially estimated
[7, 29, 49], the fact that the social contact rate is not
uniform in the population makes that the herd immunity
level should be lower than predicted on the basis of the
standard SIR-type models [50]; this is a specially nice
result of the analysis on networks,as it only depends on
general { and very reasonable {properties of the network
and not on its detailed structure, thus overcoming the
low statistics problem mentioned in Remark A1 above.
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